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Existential anxietyGrowing evidence indicates that religious belief helps individuals to cope with stress and anxiety. But is this effect
speciﬁc to supernatural beliefs, or is it amore general function of belief— including belief in science?We developed
ameasure of belief in science and conducted two experiments in which wemanipulated stress and existential anx-
iety. In Experiment 1, we assessed rowers about to compete (high-stress condition) and rowers at a training session
(low-stress condition). As predicted, rowers in the high-stress group reported greater belief in science. In Experi-
ment 2, participants primedwithmortality (vs. participants in a control condition) reported greater belief in science.
In both experiments, belief in sciencewas negatively correlatedwith religiosity. Thus, some secular individualsmay
use science as a form of “faith” that helps them to deal with stressful and anxiety-provoking situations.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Beliefs matter. Our beliefs can comfort us, provide us with meaning,
or tie us more closely to others (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Hogg &
Mulling, 1999; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Authors such as Durkheim and
Freud famously argued that religious belief plays such a role in the
lives of believers. Recent research has provided evidence for this view,
showing that religious belief can compensate for lack of control (Kay,
Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009), alleviate anxiety (Inzlicht, Tullett,
& Good, 2011; Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006), and relieve stress (Ano &
Vasconcelles, 2004). What remains unclear, however, is whether these
compensatory effects of religious belief are driven by its supernatural
or transcendent content, or whether these effects instead stem from
belief more generally. Accordingly, the aim of the present research wasFarias).
Inc. Open access under CC BY license.to investigate the relationship of stress and existential anxiety with
non-religious beliefs of an avowedly naturalistic character — belief in
science.
Religious practice and afﬁliation are on the decline in manyWestern
countries. For instance, in the latest UK census, “no religion”was the sec-
ond largest response category to an item assessing religious afﬁliation
(Ofﬁce of National Statistics, 2012). Although non-religious individuals
also face stressful and anxiety-provoking situations, it is unlikely that
they respond to such situations by appealing to beliefs with explicitly
religious or transcendent content in the way religious believers can
(e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, & Cook, 2002). An important question is thus
what beliefs, if any, play a parallel compensatory role in the lives of sec-
ular individuals.
Some have suggested that, in the absence of religious belief, secular
beliefs such as Humanism and various political ideologies can replace
religion as a source of comfort and meaning (Gray, 2004; Popper, 1945/
2003; Sartre, 1946). In linewith this notion, recent studies have suggested
that belief in humanprogress can serve the same compensatory functions
previously implicated in religious belief (Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van
Harrevald, 2009; Rutjens, van Harrevald, & van der Pligt, 2010). More
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of attitudes resembling religious faith. For example, some scientists
and philosophers are accused of “scientism” and are claimed to have a
dogmatic faith in scientiﬁcmethods and results (Stenmark, 2001). Setting
aside the merit of these accusations, it is clear that individuals differ in
their attitudes toward science. Whereas most individuals accept science
as a reliable source of knowledge about theworld, only someperceive sci-
ence as a superior, even exclusive, guide to reality, and as possessing a
unique and central value (Haught, 2005; Sorell, 1991). We refer to such
attitudes as belief in science. Such an allegiance to science often involves
the categorical rejection of anything supernatural, and is thus typically
in tension with religious belief. At the same time, religion and science
sharemotivational similarities: Scientiﬁc ideas can be a source ofmeaning
(Preston, 2012) and generate feelings commonly associatedwith religion,
such as awe (Rogers, 2004; Sagan & Druyan, 2006). It is thus of particular
interest whether belief in science can serve, in the secular context, the
same comforting role that has been associated with religious belief.
We hypothesized that belief in the value of science as an institution
and in its superiority as a source of knowledge can offer reassurance to
secular individuals in threatening contexts. We therefore expected that
situations that increase stress and existential anxiety — two constructs
associated with a range of physiological, affective, and cognitive re-
sponses to threat (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Kudielka
& Kirschbaum, 2001) — would increase belief in science. To test these
predictions, we developed a scale measuring belief in science and
conducted two experiments in which we manipulated levels of stress
or existential anxiety. Given that belief in the primacy of science is in
tension with supernatural explanations, we also anticipated that belief
in science would be negatively associated with religiosity.
Experiment 1
We developed a scale assessing belief in science and carried out a
ﬁeld study comparing a group of rowers about to compete (high-stress
condition) with a group of rowers who were training (low-stress con-
trol condition). We predicted that rowers in the high-stress condition
would report greater belief in science.
Method
Scale development
We developed a 10-item scale that described ideas about science
(see Table 1). The items were rated (1 = strongly disagree to 6 =
strongly agree) by a sample of 144 participants (92 women; mean
age = 24, SD = 7.54, range: 18–64), none of whom completed the
main study. Exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation yielded
one factor that accounted for 57% of the variance. All ten items loaded
on this factor (loadings ≥ .56; see Table 1). The scale had high inter-
nal reliability, α = .86. Overall, this sample reported moderate levels
of belief in science, M = 3.23, SD = 1.04.Table 1
Belief in science scale: Items and factor loadings from the scale validation sample.
Item Loading
Science provides us with a better understanding of the universe than
does religion.
.76
“In a demon-haunted world, science is a candle in the dark.” (Carl Sagan) .73
We can only rationally believe in what is scientiﬁcally provable. .73
Science tells us everything there is to know about what reality consists of. .78
All the tasks human beings face are soluble by science. .71
The scientiﬁc method is the only reliable path to knowledge. .84
The only real kind of knowledge we can have is scientiﬁc knowledge. .83
Science is the most valuable part of human culture. .77
Science is the most efﬁcient means of attaining truth. .83
Scientists and science should be given more respect in modern society. .56Participants and procedure
One hundred participants (46 women; mean age = 23, SD = 4.18,
range: 16–43) were recruited for the main study through rowing
coaches and athletes. Fifty-two participants were tested 35–45 min
before competing in a rowing regatta (Metropolitan Regatta, Marlow
Regatta or Henley Women's Regatta), representing the high-stress
group. The control (low-stress) group (N = 48)was tested at a training
session. Across both groups, athletes were of an amateur international
standing (i.e., routinely took part in international competitions and
trained on average 6 days per week). The questionnaire included one
itemmeasuring stress (“Howmuch stress do you feel at thismoment?”;
1 = no stress at all to 7 = verymuch), the new10-itemBelief in Science
Scale (α = .87), and one item assessing religiosity (“How religious do
you consider yourself to be?”; 1 = not at all to 7 = very much).
Results and discussion
As intended, rowers about to compete were experiencing more
stress (M = 4.04, SD = 1.36) than rowers at a training session (M =
3.02, SD = 1.76), t(98) = 3.26, p = .002, d = 0.66. Attesting to the
secular nature of the sample, participants reported a very low degree
of religious commitment (M = 1.86, SD = 1.69); religiosity did not
differ between conditions, p = .225. As expected, belief in science was
negatively correlated with religiosity, r(98) = − .29, p = .004.
Of primary interest, and as predicted, rowers in the high-stress
condition reported greater belief in science (M = 4.03, SD = 0.87)
than rowers in the low-stress condition (M = 3.54, SD = 0.86),
t(98) = 2.82, p = .006, d = 0.57. Thus, the novel measure of belief
in science differentiated between individuals facing different levels
of stress. The greater belief in science observed in the high-stress con-
dition is consistent with the notion that belief in science may help
secular individuals to cope with stress.
We acknowledge that alternative explanations for increased belief
in science in the high-stress condition are also possible. For example,
rowers about to compete (vs. rowers in training) may have been
more motivated to consider their scientiﬁc-based training regimen
or equipment. However, we also note that training regimens and
equipment may, in fact, be more salient during training sessions
(which usually revolve around such regimens and equipment).
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 in several ways. First, we ma-
nipulated existential anxiety (rather than stress) in a more controlled
experimental setting, using the mortality salience paradigm. A large
body of research has established that being reminded of one's own
death (“mortality salience”) results in existential anxiety, which leads
people to defend their belief systems (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1997).
Although it has been argued that, in the context of ideas about death,
science may not be as comforting as religion and that in such contexts
non-believers may resort to religious concepts (Inzlicht et al., 2011),
recent research revealed that mortality salience did not increase super-
natural beliefs in an atheist sample (Vail, Arndt, & Abdollahi, 2012).
Accordingly, we hypothesized that, within our secular sample, mortali-
ty salience would increase belief in science (but would not affect religi-
osity). By using a different experimentalmanipulation fromExperiment
1, we sought to show that the compensatory role of belief in science
could be generalized to other threatening contexts.
Second, we investigated whether the effect observed in Experiment 1
was speciﬁc to belief in science, or whether it also generalizes to more
particular views associated with modern science. To address this issue,
we explored a different set of science-related ideas, scientiﬁc determinism,
which reﬂects the extent to which people believe that their behavior
is shaped and determined by nature, genes, and the environment, as
opposed to their own volition (Paulhus & Carey, 2010), and is measured
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environment will determine your success as an adult.” Although the pop-
ular imagination often associates such deterministic claims with modern
science, scientiﬁc determinism and belief in science are distinct con-
structs. Scientiﬁc determinism focuses exclusively on the biological and
environmental factors that shape how people act. It is a view, not about
science, but about the world, and indeed one that some ﬁnd disturbing
rather than comforting (Pinker, 2008). By contrast, belief in science
indexes the belief that scientiﬁc inquiry is a method and form
of knowledge, superior to all others, that allows us to understand
the world. It is therefore likely that individuals derive greater
meaning and purpose from believing in the value of science, than
in causal determinants, even if scientiﬁc-based, of human behavior.
Accordingly, although we anticipated a positive association between
belief in science and scientiﬁc determinism, we nevertheless hypothe-
sized that mortality salience would increase belief in science, but not
scientiﬁc determinism.
Finally, we added a measure of spirituality, given that some individ-
uals may maintain supernatural beliefs even after rejecting organized
religion. We predicted that both religiosity and spirituality would be
negatively associated with belief in science.
Method
Participants
Sixty participants (24 women; mean age = 31, SD = 12.47, range:
17–81)were recruited among staff and students at two largeUKuniver-
sities andwere reimbursed for participating (£5 and a prize drawing for
a £100 Amazon voucher).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to themortality salience condi-
tion, N = 31, or the control condition, N = 29. Following prior work on
mortality salience (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1997), participants in the mor-
tality salience condition began the study by writing about the thoughts
and feelings aroused by thinking about their own death, whereas in
the control condition participants wrote about experiencing dental
pain. Participants next completed the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), assessing positive
(10 items; α = .87) and negative affect (10 items; α = .90). Our aim
was to provide a delay between the mortality salience manipulation
and the dependent measures (see Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon,
Simon, & Breus, 1994) and to ensure that participants' mood did not
differ between the experimental conditions.
Participants then completed (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly
agree) scales assessing belief in science (α = .88) and scientiﬁc deter-
minism (Paulhus & Carey, 2010; seven items, α = .73).
Finally, three itemsmeasured religiosity (e.g., “How religious do you
consider yourself to be?”;α = .84) and three itemsmeasured spiritual-
ity (e.g., “How spiritual do you consider yourself to be?”; α = .81).
Participants were also asked to note down any thoughts on the purpose
of the study (none guessed its true purpose).
Results and discussion
There were no differences between the two conditions on positive
and negative affect, ps = .110 and .965, respectively. There were also
no differences between the two conditions on religiosity, p = .823, or
spirituality, p = .769. Overall, participants scored low on both religios-
ity (M = 1.81, SD = 1.11) and spirituality (M = 1.98, SD = 1.29). As
expected, belief in science was negatively correlated with both religios-
ity, r(58) = − .51, p b .001, and spirituality, r(58) = − .48, p b .001.
Belief in science and scientiﬁc determinismwere positively correlated,
r(58) = .42, p = .001. Given the moderate size of this correlation, weconducted a principal components analysis (Oblimin rotation) on items
assessing belief in science and scientiﬁc determinism, which suggested
the presence of three factors. The ﬁrst factor (eigenvalue = 5.74)
consisted of the ten belief in science items (loadings ≥ .62). The second
factor (eigenvalue = 2.02) consisted of three scientiﬁc determinism
items (referring to environmental factors as determining behavior;
loadings ≥ .68). The ﬁnal factor (eigenvalue = 1.79) consisted of the
remaining four scientiﬁc determinism items (referring to biological
factors as determining behavior; loadings ≥ .66). Although scientiﬁc
determinism loaded on two factors, the full scale had acceptable inter-
nal consistency, α = .73, and we therefore averaged the seven items
into one index of scientiﬁc determinism. Together, the correlation and
the principal component analysis conﬁrm our reasoning that belief in
science and scientiﬁc determinism are related, yet distinct, constructs.
Ourmain analysiswas amultivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA),
with experimental condition as a between-subjects factor and belief in
science and scientiﬁc determinism as the dependentmeasures. Themul-
tivariate effect of condition approached signiﬁcance, F(2, 57) = 2.80,
p = .069,η2p = .09. Supporting our primary prediction, univariate anal-
yses revealed that participants reported signiﬁcantly greater belief in sci-
ence in the mortality salience condition (M = 3.94, SD = 1.04) than in
the control condition (M = 3.41, SD = 0.67), F(1, 58) = 5.39, p =
.024, η2p = .09. In contrast, as anticipated, the effect of condition on sci-
entiﬁc determinism was nonsigniﬁcant, F(1, 58) = 1.99, p = .164,
η2p = .03 (mortality salience condition: M = 3.44, SD = 0.74; control
condition:M = 3.19, SD = 0.66).General discussion
Science and religion are often taken to offer competing explanations
of the world (Preston & Epley, 2009). That science can be a source of
meaning, similar to religion, is not a completely new idea; it has been
raised by philosophers (Ziman, 1978/1991) and scientists (Dawkins,
1997) alike. While many have attempted to understand the emotional
or social underpinnings of religious belief, the possibility that science
might serve similar psychological functions has received less attention.
Employing a novel ﬁeld experiment and a well-researched experimen-
tal paradigm, our two experiments indicate that belief in science
increases when individuals are placed in threatening situations. Our
ﬁndings suggest that belief in science may help non-religious people
deal with adverse conditions, as has been reported previously for
religious belief (Inzlicht et al., 2011; Kay et al., 2009; Norenzayan &
Hansen, 2006), belief in progress (Rutjens et al., 2009; Rutjens, van
der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2010), and belief in intelligent design and
evolutionary theory (Rutjens, van der Pligt, et al., 2010; Tracy, Hart, &
Martens, 2011). We acknowledge, however, that we examined only
one direction of the effect; investigating whether afﬁrming one's belief
in science indeed reduces stress and existential anxiety thus represents
a particularly productive direction for future research.
We acknowledge a further limitation, which may in fact inspire
future research in fruitful ways: In Experiment 2, we did not observe
an effect of mortality salience on religiosity, which is in apparent con-
trast with previous work that has found an increase in religiosity after
a mortality prime (e.g., Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006). We suggest two
reasons for this null effect: First, we assessed self-perceived religiosity
and extent of religious practice, while other studies on mortality
salience have used measures of religious belief; our measure was, thus,
likely not sensitive to changes in religious belief. Second, and more
importantly, our participants were largely secular (e.g., in Experiment
2, 51 out of 60 participants scored below the scale midpoint on
religiosity). Mortality salience is expected to activate beliefs that are
relevant to one's worldview (e.g., Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon,
Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989), and should thus not activate religiosity
among secular individuals (Vail et al., 2012). Future researchwould ben-
eﬁt from testing secular and religious populations to directly compare
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satory effects of scientiﬁc and religious belief.
The relationship between belief in science and belief in progress
also needs to be addressed. Is belief in science a belief in a human
institution that is continually advancing, whichwouldmake it a speciﬁc
case of belief in progress; or is it belief in a method that allows us
to make sense of the world? Contrary to belief in progress, which is
laden with a sense of positive hope and is therefore essentially an eval-
uative concept (Rutjens et al., 2009; Rutjens, van der Pligt, et al., 2010),
belief in science is largely an epistemic worldview, expressing conﬁ-
dence in a distinctive method for understanding the world. The two
notions need not overlap: One can have conﬁdence in science, yet
hold a deeply pessimistic view of the future. Conversely, there is no ep-
istemic component to belief in progress, which is associated withmoral
progress and is, in principle, compatible with belief in the supernatural.
It is perhaps not surprising that secular belief systems likeHumanism
and belief in progress can play a comforting role, as they present the
world as a broadly moral order. By contrast, our ﬁndings suggest that
merely believing in the superiority of science as a method of making
sense of the universe may be sufﬁcient to play such a compensatory
role, even if the order that science reveals is not moral, and perhaps
independently of any optimism about the future.
The suggested parallels between religious belief and belief in science
may seem to be in tension with recent work emphasizing the intuitive
character of religious belief. Tasks involving more analytic processing
were shown to decrease religious belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012),
whereas the stimulation of a more intuitive mindset led to a greater
belief in God (Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). Contrary to religion, sci-
entiﬁc practice is deﬁned by analytical thinking; rational enquiry and
weighing of evidence are given precedence even when they conﬂict
with intuition. But when it comes to believing, even if it is a belief in
the scientiﬁc method as opposed to divine revelation, the underlying
mechanismmay be similar. Despite their differentmethods, both science
and religion offer powerful explanations of the world (Preston & Epley,
2005), which may work at an intuitive level to provide comfort and
assurance. That modern secular individuals are prone to cling on to
beliefs about science, in the same way that their ancestors turned to
the gods, carries no judgment on the value of science as a method but
simply highlights the human motivation to believe.
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